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CASE
NOTE
Meck v. ParamedicServices of Illinois:
Proximate Cause and the Lost Chance
Doctrine in Illinois
by Jennifer Deitchman

I. INTRODUCTION
Illinois state courts have long
had conflicting opinions concerning
the standard for recovery in medical
malpractice suits.' The most recent
claims at issue have requested the
expansion of medical malpractice
liability to instances where the
defendant's negligence caused a "loss
of chance," a reduction in the statistical
possibility of survival for the patient.2
Because of the lack of definitive
precedent from the Illinois Supreme
Court, the appellate courts were at
odds with one another to formulate the
appropriate rule of law concerning
proximate cause in these lost chance
cases. 3 Unfortunately, this disparity
created confusion and inconsistency
among the jurisdictions.
Finally, the Illinois Supreme
Court held in Holton v. Memorial
Hospitalthat plaintiffs could recover in
lost chance cases if they proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that
their chances of survival were
decreased by defendants' negligence. 5
As a result, the First District Appellate
Court of Illinois was able to apply this
new rule of law in Meck v. Paramedic
Services of Illinois on the appellate level
1999

and create the appropriate standard of
review for decisions on summary
judgment.6
Part II of this Note identifies the
problems with determining proximate
cause in lost chance cases. In addition,
Part II outlines the two arguments
presented in decisions leading up to
Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois.
Part III discusses the reasoning behind
the decision in Meck. Part IV compares
the court's decision with the preceding
cases, and concludes that the correct
solution was formulated to determine
proximate cause in lost chance cases.
Finally, Part V examines how the Meck
decision will influence future case law
and the quality of care provided to the
critically ill.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Concept of Lost Chance
The lost chance of survival
doctrine is generally invoked in
situations involving a plaintiff who
loses a statistically viable chance of
living due to the negligent conduct of
the defendant.7 The most common lost
chance situation occurs in a medical
malpractice suit where a patient with a
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pre-existing condition charges the
medical community with malpractice
in its treatment of that condition.8 The
main issue arises when different
standards are used for determining
whether the pre-existing condition or
the malpractice is the proximate cause
of the injury.9 As a result, many Illinois
courts have debated the possibility of
recovery allowed in lost chance cases
and have arrived at different
conclusions of law. ° However, both
sides of the debate at the Illinois
appellate level cited to the vague
language in the same case, Borowski v.
Von Solbrig, for precedent when

deciding whether to allow recovery."
The Illinois appellate courts
allowing recovery in lost chance
situations struggled with the
traditional tort standard that would
require proof that "but for" the
negligence of the tortfeasor injury or
death probably would not have
occurred. 2 Because of the factual
context of most lost chance cases, it
was very difficult to prove with any
degree of medical certainty that
patients who were in critical condition
would have survived regardless of any
alleged malpractice. 3 As a result,

Illinois appellate courts were forced to
rely on a different proximate cause
4
standard in order to allow recovery.
B. Advocates for the Lost Chance
Doctrine
This different standard for
proximate cause in lost chance
situations was borrowed from the
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court who
relied on Section 323 of the Second
Restatement of Torts for its reasoning'
The Restatement indicates that if a
defendant's negligence increases the
risk of physical harm to the plaintiff, he
or she is subject to liability for that
increased risk. 16 Using this standard,
the plaintiff does not need to prove
that the defendant's negligence was the
sole cause of the harm or the increased
risk, but that it was a contributing
7
cause.'
The First District Appellate
Court of Illinois applied this new
standard in Northern Trust Co. v. Louis
Weiss Memorial Hospital and Chambers v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke's Medical
Center.' In Northern Trust, plaintiff was
suing defendant hospital for
negligence in regards to the delay of
treatment of a newborn gradually
deteriorating from respiratory failure. 9
In that case, the plaintiff's medical
expert testified that because of the
delay of proper care, the baby did
suffer from increased morbidity,
although he could not specify how
much. 20 As a result, the Northern Trust
court held for the plaintiff reasoning
that once there is evidence that the
defendant's negligence caused an
increased risk of harm in the plaintiff,
then the case should go to the jury to
determine whether the increased risk
was a substantial factor in producing
the harm.'
The First District also ruled in
Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterianthat the
jury should decide on proximate cause
where evidence is presented that the
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defendant's negligence increased the
risk of harm to the plaintiff.22 The
Chambers court held that the negligence
need not be the only cause or the
nearest cause of the injury.23
In addition, the Chambers court
also overruled the "better result" test in
support of the Illinois Supreme Court
in Borowski v. Von Solbrig.24 Both the
Chambers court and the Borowski court
held that it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to prove that a better result
would have occurred had the
defendant not been negligent. 25
C. Dissenters of the Lost Chance
Doctrine
The appellate courts Illinois also
rejected the new standard of proximate
cause for lost chance cases. 26 The court
in Hare v. Foster G.McGaw Hospital
ruled that the mother of a patient who
died from complications caused by
Hepatitus B could not recover damages
from the hospital for its negligent
treatment of her son.27 In this case, the
First District used Borowski for its
rationale and held that the plaintiff was
required to prove that the defendant's
failure to hospitalize the patient more
likely than not resulted in his death.28
Because of the lack of this definitive
proof, the plaintiff was denied
recovery.29
In Netto v. Goldenberg, the
Second District Appellate Court of
Illinois followed the Hare decision by
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's negligence more likely
than not caused the plaintiff's injury.3
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In addition, the Netto court also
overturned the "substantial factor"
theory advanced in Northern Trust
claiming that it reduced the standard
for probable cause.31
As a result of the Hare and Netto
decisions, statistics became a vital
element of proof in lost chance medical
malpractice cases. 32 In order for the
plaintiff to recover in a lost chance
scenario, he or she would have to
prove that the patient would have had
a better than fifty percent chance of
recovery in order to establish that the
negligence, not the pre-existing
condition, was the proximate cause of
the harm. 3 If the expert testimony
could only establish a fifty percent
chance of recovery or lower, then the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover for
lack of proximate cause. 34
D. The New Rule of Law on Lost
Chance
In this environment of
contradictions within the appellate
districts, the llinois Supreme Court
decided to settle the debate in 1997
with its ruling in Holton v. Memorial
Hospital.3 In Holton, the Illinois
Supreme Court sided with the Northern
Trust and the Chamberscourts by
lowering the standard for recovery in
lost chance cases. 6 Here, the plaintiff
suffered from paraplegia due to the
defendant's negligence in failing to
properly diagnose her condition in a
timely fashion.37 The Holton court held
that in a lost chance medical
malpractice suit, proximate cause may
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be established if the defendant's
negligence is found to have more likely
than not increased the plaintiff's risk of
harm. 3 In addition, the Illinois
Supreme Court specifically overruled
the bar against allowing recovery in
cases where the patient's recovery is
estimated to be less than fifty percent. 39
III. DISCUSSION
In Meek v. ParamedicServices of

Illinois, the First District Appellate
Court of Illinois considered whether
the lost chance doctrine as applied in
the Holton case should be applied
when ruling on defendant's motion for
summary judgment.40 The circuit court
had granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on the
reasoning in the Hare decision ruling
that the plaintiff needed to prove that
the defendant's negligence more likely
than not caused the injury to the
decedent.4' In addition, the decedent
had to have a greater than a fifty
percent chance at recovery, absent the
malpractice, to prove that the
defendant's negligence, not the preexisting condition, was the proximate
cause.42 Because the expert testimony
could not establish a fifty percent
chance at recovery, the circuit court
ruled in favor of defendant's motion
for summary judgment.43
In Meek, the decedent, Mr. Roy
Meck, suffered a massive heart attack
in his home. 44 Minutes later the
emergency medical technicians (EMTs)
and paramedics arrived and found Mr.
Meck unconscious and without a
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pulse. 45 The paramedics stated that
they were able to defibrillate and
intubate Mr. Meck in order to establish
a pulse. 46 By the time they reached the
hospital, Mr. Meck's heart was
resuscitated, but he had suffered severe
neurological damage.47 He died four
days later.4 8
Plaintiff filed a complaint
arguing that the paramedics and EMTs
violated the professional standard of
care by their willful and wanton
misconduct on six counts.49 The
defendant paramedics and the City of
Berwyn filed motion for summary
judgment claiming that the plaintiff
could not prove proximate cause since
the decedent did not have a greater
than fifty percent chance of survival
absent the alleged misconduct.50 The
trial court subsequently granted the
motion for summary judgment and
denied plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration.," The plaintiff
52
appealed both of these decisions.
The standard for granting a
motion for summary judgment is
where "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." 53 In
addition, the court must analyze the
evidence in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.5 4 If the reviewing court
determines that a genuine issue of
determining fact exists, then the
summary judgment must be
overturned.5
The First District also
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considered the ramifications of the
llinois Emergency Medical Services
Systems Act which serves to protect
paramedics and EMTs from negligence
claims.-s In order to file suit, the
plaintiff would have to prove willful or
wanton misconduct.57 The Meck court
ruled that the case at hand would
qualify under this definition, exhibiting
a reckless disregard for the safety of
others, as defined by previous case
law.5
In considering the issue of lost
chance, the Meck court ruled, like the
Holton court before it, that the Borowski
test did not lower the plaintiff's burden
of proving causation.59 Instead, the
Borowski standard served to prevent
the introduction of collateral issues that
would result from plaintiff having to
prove that a better result would have
occurred absent the defendant's
negligence6
Next, the Meck court again
followed the rulling in Hilton and held
that restricting recovery for negligence
against the seriously ill would act as a
disincentive to the medical profession
to provide quality health care. 61 The
defendants argued that they should not
be held responsible for any injury to
Mr. Meck since he was dead when they
arrived at the scene. 62 However, the
court overturned this argument since
the decedent was actually revived and
lived for four days. 63
The First District then held the
trial court in error for granting the
motion for summary judgment and not
applying the standard of proximate
cause expressed in Holton v. Memorial
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Hospital.64 Although admitting that the
standard established by Holton is to be
used at the trial level and not at the
appellate stage, the Meck court applied
the Holton standard to the case at
hand. 65
Finally, the Meck court held that
proximate cause was an issue of
material fact that should be decided by
the jury.66 The Meck court ruled that the
trial court erred when it held that the
plaintiff could not prove proximate
cause as a matter of law because Mr.
Meck had a less than fifty percent
chance of survival.67 The appellate
court's rationale was that the statistical
probability of Mr. Meck's survival was
not relevant to the injury caused by the
defendant or to the ruling on the
motion for summary judgment.6
IV. ANALYSIS
The First District ruled
appropriately in the Meck decision with
regards to the current state of Illinois
law in loss of chance cases. The
Borowski, Northern Trust, Chambers, and
Holton decisions have all determined
that recovery should be allowed in
medical malpractice suits where the
defendant's negligence is not the sole
cause. 69 The Meck court correctly
applied the law established by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Holton to the
standard of review for decisions on
summary judgment and rejected the
reasoning establishing a statistical
prerequisite for recovery.70
As the Illinois Supreme Court
determined in Holton, barring recovery
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for negligence committed against
seriously ill patients with less than a
fifty percent chance of survival creates
a bias in the medical community
against those patients who need the
most help. 71 By allowing the jury to
decide on lost chance cases, the Meck
and Holton courts have helped to
eliminate any potential prejudice
within the medical community against
critically ill patients.72
Next, the rejection of statistics
when analyzing proximate cause will
help to prevent possible fraud in expert
testimony.73 By setting fifty percent as
an arbitrary bar to recovery, the courts
would be encouraging potential
plaintiffs to find any way possible to
get over the statistical hurdle in order
to have their cases heard. 74 As a result,
the courts would find themselves
wading through conflicting expert
testimony in every case as to which
party's numbers add up to proximate
cause as a matter of law.7 Setting a
statistical boundary will trivialize the
proximate cause issue and actually
allow cases that would not have
qualified under traditional standards
to muddle the court system.76 The Meck
court ruled correctly to eliminate the
statistical squabbles.
Finally, the Meck court held
correctly that the Northern Trust

decision did not lower the standard of
proximate cause as held by the Hare
court? Instead, by allowing the jury to

decide proximate cause as a matter of
fact, the Meck court has guaranteed
that proximate cause will remain a
viable issue for the plaintiff.8 In order
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to recover, the plaintiff must be able to
convince an entire jury instead of one
judge that the defendant was
negligent. 79
V. IMPACT
Although prior decisions have
ruled in favor of recovery in lost
chance cases, the Meck court's decision
specifically will help to solidify the rule
of law established in Holton and extend
it to rulings on motions for summary
judgment. 8° Consequently, there will be
fewer lost chance cases rejected at the
onset of trial since proximate cause will
be considered a jury question.8 '
Furthermore, now that the
Illinois Supreme Court has established
the law in lost chance cases, future
parties have a consistent standard with
which to plan their strategies.82 Before
the Holton and Meck decisions, the
standard of law depended more on the
jurisdiction or the judge rather than a
reliable, established rule of law. 3 Now
that the rule is established, there will
be more consistency in the outcomes of
lost chance cases. 84
Finally, the medical community
will be held more accountable to the
quality of care given to the critically
ill. By rejecting the notion that
medical malpractice can continue to
rob the critically ill of their hope of
survival without any accountability,
the Meck and Holton courts have
established that chances of survival
should be a protected commodity.86
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the illinois courts
have established that proximate cause
in lost chance medical practice cases is
a question of fact for the jury.
Proximate cause can be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence proving
that defendant's negligence was a
cause of the injury or loss of chance. As
a result, the Illinois courts now have a
consistent, fair standard with which to
work.
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